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ABSTRACT 
A "random" n-person non-cooperative game--the game that prohibits 
communication a d therefore coalitions among the n players--is shown to have 
with high probability a pure strategy solution. Such a solution is by definition 
an equilibrium point or a set of strategies, one for each player, such that if 
n -- 1 players use their equilibrium strategies then the n-th player has no reason to 
deviate from his equilibrium strategy. It is shown that the probability ofa solution 
in pure strategies for large random n-person games converges to (1 -- I/e) for 
all n ~ 2. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of  a solution frequently used for an n-person non- 
cooperative game is the equi l ibr ium point [1]. In order to assure the 
existence of  a solution it is necessary to introduce mixed strategies 
(probabil ist ic mixtures of  ordinary or "pure"  strategies). Except for the 
2-person game, however, it is generally very difficult to compute a mixed 
strategy solution. Further,  many decision makers may be reluctant to 
accept the operat ional  not ion of a mixed strategy. 
These l imitations of  mixed strategies lead natural ly to the hope that 
mixed strategy solutions are rarely required, i.e., a game chosen at 
random will in fact possess a pure strategy solution. For  a 2-person 
zero-sum game this hope is not  fulfilled; Go ldman [2] showed that for 
such a game with many strategies it is a lmost certain that all solutions 
will require mixed strategies, the chance of  a pure strategy solution 
being almost negligible. 
It was conjectured that 2-person non-zero-sum games would have a 
similar property. But Goldberg,  Goldman,  and Newman [4] showed that 
for the 2-person game the probabi l i ty  of a pure strategy solution is quite 
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large when the players have many strategies to choose among, in fact 
converging to 1 -- e-L 
The present paper extends the results to n-person games (n > 2). It is 
shown that the probability that an n-person game (n ~> 2) has a pure 
strategy solution converges to 1 -- e -1 as the number of strategies of each 
of the n players increases. Further, this result is also valid if only two of 
the n sets of player strategies increase without bound. 
2. GAMES AND TRUNCATIONS 
In the normal form of an n-person oncooperative game the i-th player 
(i ~< n) has mi strategies which we label ui (1 ~< u~ ~< m,). A play of a 
game can be represented by an n-vector U = (ul, u2 ..... u~), giving us 
n 
I-L=~ m~ -- ~r possible plays. For each play U and each player i there 
exists a payoff M~(U), representing the payoff to the i-th player for the 
play U. There are therefore nrr payoffs. 
We now define a truncation of a play with respect o the i-th player to 
be an n -- 1 vector: 
U i .-~ (u l ,  u2 .... , u i -1 ,  Ui+l .... , un). 
A truncation of a play leaves out the i-th player's strategy, a fact our 
notation expresses as 
U = (Ui, u~). 
A game is called zero-sum if ~,1 M~(U) = 0 for every play U. Despite 
a few allusions to properties of such games for purposes of contrast, the 
games treated in this paper are not constrained to be zero-sum. 
3. EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
Nash [1] first introduced the notion of an equilibrium point, and he 
showed that every game possesses uch a point in mixed strategies. 
An n-vector of pure strategies U* = (ul*, u2*,..., u~*) is an equilibrium 
point in pure strategies if for each i ~< n and ui <~ mi , 
Mi(U*) ~ M~(U~*, u3. (1) 
Equivalently, we have, for each i ~ n, 
Mi(U*)  : max Mi(Ui*, ui). (2) 
u i~mi  
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I f  the above condition is satisfied, U* will be referred to as a pure 
equilibrium point or PE solution or just PE. For a 2-person zero-sum 
game a PE solution is the same as a saddle-point. We also call a PE point 
a solution of the n-person game. 
4. RANDOM GAMES 
It is wellknown that PE solutions are rare for 2-person zero-sum games. 
For example, the probability that a "random" 2-person zero-sum game 
has a PE solution is 
ml! m2! 
(ml fi- m2 -- 1)! " 
This result, proved in [2] and [3], exhibits the need for mixed strategies, 
even if the number of strategies for each player is not very large in the 
2-person zero-sum game. 
It is natural to inquire about the need for mixed strategies in arbitrary 
n-person games. Is it likely that we can get by with pure strategies ? To 
answer to this inquiry we analyze "random games." 
We define a random n-person game by the following properties: 
(i) The nzr payoffs M~(U), are independent random variables. 
(ii) For each i, the payoffs MI(U) have the same (independent of U) 
continuous probability distribution. 
From the above definition of a random game it follows that, with 
probability one, the mr payoffs are distinct in such a game. From now on, 
the zero-probability set of games not having distinct payoffs will be ruled 
out of the analysis. Further, the probability that a random n-person game 
has a PE solution is now welldefined. 
Let E(U) be the event that play U is a PE solution of the game. More 
generally, for any family F of plays, let E(F) be the event that every U in 
F is a PE solution. Now let F~ denote the set of all F with cardinality t, 
and set 
St = ~ (Pr(E(F)) [ r in F~}. 
Let Pn(mx, m2 ,..., m,) be the probability that a random n-person game, 
where the n players have ml ,  m2 ..... mn strategies, respectively, has at 
least one PE solution. Then 
P,~(mt , m~ ,..., mn) = Pr l~vE(U) I. 
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Then, by the so-called method of inclusion and exclusion, 
P.(ml,  m2 .... , m.) = ~ (--1)*+1S,. 
t=l 
For any play U, the n events 
Mi(U) = max Mi(Ui, ui) 
ui <~m~ 
are independent since they involve disjoint sets of independent random 
variables. Since the i-th of these events has probability 1/m,, we have 
1 
Pr{E(U)} = - - .  
7"1" 
5. POSSIBLE SETS OF t EQUILIBRIUM POINTS 
In order to determine St we shall derive a condition that t given plays 
of a random game have non-zero probability of being simultaneously 
among its equilibrium points. Our definition of equilibrium point and 
random game yields the following: 
THEOREM l. A necessary and sufficient condition that U t, U 2 ..... U s are, 
with non-zero probability, t equilibrium points of an n-person random game 
is that 
Ui 1, Ui~,..., U~ ~ are distinct for each i <~ n. 
Proof. Suppose 
U~l= U?. 
Then, since U 1 and U s are equilibrium points, 
Mi(U 1) = max Mi(Ui 1, ui) 
ui<~m i 
= max Mi(Ui 2, ui) = Mi(UZ), 
u i~m i
contradicting the stipulation that, with probability one, all nrr payoffs 
are distinct. 
The sufficiency follows from the continuity assumption on the payoff 
distribution and from the fact that the nt events 
Mi(UO = max Mi(Uj, ui) 
u i~mt  
involve disjoint sets of independent random variables. 
58z/8/x-lo 
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Since the U's are n-vectors and the U~'s are (n -- 1)-vectors, the theorem 
states that each pair of U's must differ in at least wo of their n components 
in order for all to bePE solutions. 
Using Theorem 1, we can give an explicit formula for St 9 Let Ft* consist 
of those F in Ft for which Pr{E(F)} > 0, so that  
St = ~ {Pr(E(F)) I F in Ft*}. 
Now the members F-----{U 1, U2,..., U t} of Ft* are characterized in 
Theorem 1, and for any such F in Ft* the t events E(U 0 refer to disjoint 
sets of:indepeI~dent random variables and so are independent. Since 
Pr{E(U0} = l[zr, it follows that 
Pr{E(F)} 1 q-t 
for each F in Ft,  Let N, represent the cardinality of Ft*; then 
St = Ndrd, 
and 
Pn(ml,  m 2 ..... m~) = ~ (--1)t+lNtrr-t. (3) 
t=l 
6. EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN Two-PERSON GAMES 
i fn  = 2, a play ot the game can be represented by a 2-vector U = (a, fl). 
It follows from Theorem 1 that, in order for (o~ 1, ill),..., (o~,, fit) to be a 
possible set of t equilibrium points, 
~1, ~2,..., at are distinct 
and 
/31,/32 ..... /3t are distinct. 
To compute Nt, we observe that t distinct a's can be chosen in (~0 
ways and t distinct/3's can be chosen in (~2) ways, and then the two sets 
can be paired off in t t ways. Thus 
(rnl]{m2] 
Nt = \ t / \  t ] t!, 
and 
P2(ml m2) = E ( - -1 )  t+1 (ml~(m2~ ' \ t /~  t ! tl(mlm~)-*. (4) 
This result was first obtained by Goldberg, Goldman, and Newman [4]. 
They also obtained the asymptotic value of Pz(ml,  ms). 
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7. EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN THREE-PERSON-GAMES 
If n ---- 3, it is convenient to decompose the set of ~r = mlm2m3 plays 
into mlm2 sets of the form Sty. Each member U----(ul, uz, u3) of 
St; is such that Ux = i, u2 = j, u3 ~< m3 9 Thus each set Si; contains m3 
plays. Now each St; can contain at most one equilibrium point. Therefore 
N~ is the number of ways of carrying out the following process: 
(i) Choose a family $1 ~ of t sets Sqjl, St~.~ ..... Sit; t from the mlm2 
sets Stj. 
(ii) Choose one member from each of these t sets so that the resulting t
plays obey the condition of Theorem 1. 
Let/z(t I S~ t) be the number of ways of making the t choices in (ii) 
above. Thus/z(t I S~ ~) is the number of ways of choosing t equilibrium 
points from the t given sets Sta~, S~j~ ,..., S~,~, and we have 
Nt = ~/~(t [$1'), 
where the sum is over all choices of S1 ~. If we consider the choice of 
Si c as made at random, then/z(t I Sa t) is a random variable whose mean 
value will be denoted by/~(t). Since each Sa t has probability 1/(ml~ ) of 
being chosen it follows that 
Nt = (ml.m21 t~(t). (5) 
\ l /  
From the above definition of/z(t J $1 t) we have the following inequalities: 
mz(m3 --  1).-. (m3 -- t q- 1) ~/z(t  [ S~ t) ~< m3 t. (6) 
Therefore, its mean value,/~(t), also satisfies the inequality 
( t3)t !  ~/z(t )  ~ ms t. (7) 
For example, if t ----- l, ~(1) = ms and 
N 1 : (mxm2)m3 : 7r. 
If t = 2, we have 
~(21 s#)  = m3 ~, 
/z(2 !$12) = (m3 -- 1)m3, 
if 6v6 i2 ,  A=f iA ,  
if i 1=/2  or J l - - - .s  
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We can now compute 
/,(2) = mz2(ml -- 1)(m2 --  1) + (m3 --  1) m3(mx + m2 --  2) 
(mx -- 1)(m2 -- 1) + m I -l- m2 -- 2 
= m3(zr - -S+2 ), 
m~-- f  
where S = mx + m2 + m3. 
Substituting in (5) we have 
[mam2] 7r(zr - -  S --~ 2) 
N2 /,(2) ~ 2]  2 
To compute/*(3) we need to examine four cases: 
/*(3 I Sx z) = 
"m~(m3 --  1)(ma --  2), 
rn3(m 3 --  1) 2, 
m33~ 
m3(m 3 - -  1) 3, 
if /1=i2=i3  and j l5  & j2~j3  
or if j l  = J3=J3  and /15 ~=i2@i3;  
i f  il = i2 :/= i3 , j l  :/= j2 ~ jz  
or i f  j l  = j2 =/= j3 , ix :T& i2 :/- i3 ; 
i f  il :# i2 ~ i3 , jx :;& j~ ~ j3 ; 
if /1 = i2 :~ is and Jx ----- J3:7~ J2 
or i f jx = J2r  and ix=is3  &i2.  
The frequencies associated with each of  the four above values of  
/*(3 I Sx 3) are proportional to, respectively, 
(ml - -  1)(mx --  2) + (m2 -- 1)(m2 --  2), 
2 (mx-  1 ) (m2-  1 )2+ 2(ml -  1)2(m2- 1), 
(mx -- 1)(m2 -- 1)(mlm2 - -  mx --  m2), 
2(ml- 1)(m2- 1). 
The sum of the above frequencies i (mlm2 -- 1)(mxm2 -- 2). 
Using the above frequencies and values of/*(3 t Sx z) we obtain the value 
of/*(3) as a function o fmx,  m2, m3. In particular, if ml = m2 = ma ---- m, 
we have 
/*(3) = m(m -- 1)(m 4 + 2m 8 -- 8m 2 +6)  
(m+ 1)(m 2 -2)  
and 
(3  2) m3(m-  1)2(m ~ + 2rn 8 8m 2 + 6) 
N3 = /*(3) = 6 
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In a similar manner we can compute the values of Nt,  where 
t <~ min(mlm2, m3), 
and then compute the required probability 
Pz(ml ,  m2, ma) = ~ (--1)*+xU, n - '  
t= l  
= ~ (--1)'+1 (mtm2)/~(,)~r -*. (8) 
*=1 
It is of interest o determine the asymptotic value of Pa(mi ,  ms ,  ms) 
as the number of strategies increases for each player. We note that the 
absolute value of the t-th term of the series for Ps is 
l l~( ,  ) l~[ (mi ra2- -k  + 1) 
t~ I I  k=l mlm2m3 
From (7) it follows that the absolute value of the t-th term satisfies the 
inequality 
k=l  mim2ma " k=l  \ mlmg 
or  
9 = ms mlm2 . = mxm~ 
Hence we obtain 
which by (8) suggests 
1 
l im N,~-* = T.I' 
m 1,m~ ,ms~ oo 
( - -  1)~+ 1 
lim P3(mx, ms,  ms) = ~ t! --  1 -- e -1. 
m 1,m 2 ,m~co t=l 
Detailed proof of this will be given in the proof of Theorem 2. 
8. PURE EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN n-PERSON GAMES 
We now evaluate the probability of a PE solution in a random n-person 
game, where the i-th player has mi strategies. In such a game the set of 
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rr = mlm 2 ... mn plays can be decomposed into mlm s ... m~-x = M sets 
of  the form Sqi,..%_l where each set contains m,~ plays. Each member 
U = (Ux, Us ..... un) ofSqq. .%_ 1 has the property that ux = ix, us = is ..... 
u,_i = i,_1, and u, ~< m,~ = m. Thus each of the M sets contains m plays. 
From Theorem 1 it follows that each set Sq~ ..%_ 1 can contain at most 
one PE point. Therefore choosing t plays which can simultaneously be 
equil ibrium points f rom the rr plays is  equivalent o choosing t of  the 
M sets and then choosing one play f rom each of  these t chosen sets. 
Again, let/ , (t  I $1 t) be the number  of ways of choosing t plays which can 
simultaneously be equilibrium points from the t given sets (we emphasize 
that only one point may be chosen f rom each set) and let/*(t) represent i s 
mean value. Then, we have 
N, = (M)/z(t).  
From our definition of the random variable/*(t [Sit), 
m(m - -  1)" -  (m -- t -q- 1) <~/z(t [ $1 t) ~ rn t. 
Therefore the mean value/*(t) satisfies the same inequality, or 
(7 )  t! ~/z ( t )  ~ m s. (lO) 
The required probabil ity of  a PE point in a random game is given by 
Pn(ml ,m2 ..... m,) ----- ~ (--1) t+l (M)(Mm)_ttx(t).  (11) 
t= l  
For each M and m one can compute the probabi l i ty P,~ by first com- 
puting/*(t) when t ~< min(m, M). Now from the definition of/*(t) we have 
/*(1) = m. In order to compute /,(2) we pick two sets, Sqq..%_ 1 and 
S6j ..%_ 1 , f rom the M sets. We have then 
tm 2, if i, ~ J l ,  is 3&js ..... in-X =)&A-1 , 
tz(2lS*2) = {m(m--1) ,  if il = j ,  or is = Js  ..... or t'n-1 = J~- l .  
Now the frequency associated with/,(2 [ 5:1 s) = m 2 is proport ional to D, 
where 
D = (mx --  1)(m2 -- 1) ... (m,_l - -  1). 
The frequency associated with ~(2 IS12) = m(m - -  1) is proport ional to 
DE,  where 
n--X l 
E = ~ m i _  1 9 
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Hence we have 
m2D + m(m -- 1) DE 
/2(2) = D q7 DE 
E 
=m(m I+E)"  
In a similar manne~ we can compute /z(3), /,(4) ..... /z(~), where 
= min(m, M), 
and then obtain Pn. Of course, the computation of /,(t) becomes more 
cumbersome with each value of r However, Pn has an asymptotic value 
given by 
THEOREM 2. For all n-person games (n >~ 2) 
lim Pn(ml  , ms  , . . ,  m~)  = 1 - -  e - l .  
mlmg.,, mn_l -~oa 
mn~ 
Proof. Equation (11) may be written as 
(__l)t+l t--1 ( s  
Pn(M, m) = ,=1 ~" t! I~(t) m't  "i=1I-[ 1 -- M " 
Hence we have 
P,(M, m) -- (1 e -1) ----- ~. ~ 1 --/~(t) m :t I-[ 1 " . (12) 
t=l i=1 
Now let ,_1( ,) 
a~(M, m) = ~(t) m-'  1"-[ 1 - -  ~ , 
From (10) it follows that for all t 
H -2)( '-1( 
I ] ( ' - -  1 -  M)~< ,~,(g, m)~ l- [ l - -M)  ~1.  (13) 
'/=1 i=l 
Now for all i ~< T < M we have 
i T 
1>~1- -~>1 M" 
Hence 
t--ll_i (1 __ M) > (1 - -  -~-,T~ '-1 > (1 -- -~-) r fo r t~T~M.  
i=l 
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Similarly we have that 
t - -1  ~(~_/ )>(1_5 /  for t <~ T <~ m. 
Substituting the above inequalities in (13) we have 
~", ~) ~ (~ - ~)~ 0 - 2 ;  
~)(1-~) (1 -- Tz 
>/ (1 T2 
M -~). 
for t ~< T <~ rain(m, M) 
Now T is arbitrary but T < M and T < m. Suppose we restrict T so 
that T 3 < M, and T 3 < m, then TZ/M < 1/T and T2/m < 1/T, and we 
obtain the inequality 
2 
At(M, m) >I 1 -- --~ 
Therefore 
2 
0 ~< 1 -- At(M,m) <-T  
for t ~< T < T 3 < min(m, M). 
for t ~< T < T 3 < min(m, M). 
Returning to (12) we have for t ~< T < T 8 < min(m, M) 
r 1 ~ (--1) t I "~(M, m) -  (1 e-1)J ~ t~El= ~-" (~-) + t>r " [1 ~,r  ~11 
2 2 (--1)' 
<~Teq- l t>r  t, [' -- 2v(M' m)l l" 
The second term represents the "tail" of a converging alternating series. 
Thus, given any 8 > 0, we can choose T sufficiently large that 
I ( -  1) t I 
J ,>r2 tt [1 -- 2,t(M, m)lJ < 5, (14) 
and 
2 
[ Pn(M,m) -- (1--  e-1)] <Te+& 
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Now by choosing T > 2e/8, we have 
I Pn(M, m) - -  (1 -- e-a)l < 23, 
which proves the theorem. 
It is of interest o note that Theorem 2 requires only that two of the 
n sets of player strategies grow without bound. 
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